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And even as we, who are now in Space, look down on Flatland and
see the insides of all things, so of a certainty there is yet above us some
higher, purer region, whither though dost surely purpose to lead me
O my Priest, Philosopher, and Friend some yet more spacious Space,
some more dimensionable Dimensionality, from the vantage-ground
of which we shall look down together upon the revealed insides of
Solid things, and where thine own intestines, and those of thy kindred
Spheres, will lie exposed to the view of the poor wandering exile from
Flatland, to whom so much has already been vouchsafed. (Abbott
1952, 88)
Could the three-dimensionality of the world be an illusion? That is,
could the world appear to have a di¤erent number of spatial dimensions than
it actually has? If the question concerns mere possibility, then the answer is
clearly yes there are many ways this might be. The most straightforward,
perhaps, is the scenario explored in Flatland (Abbott 1952). Consider a race
of creatures whose movements and sensory experiences are conned to a plane
within a three-dimensional world. Such a world appears to its inhabitants
to be two-dimensional. However, the illusory nature of this appearance can
be revealed to them by interaction with an ordinary three-dimensional being
like us, via such phenomena as appearing from nowherewithin a locked
room, or describing the current state of a Flatlanders intestines. Similarly,
we can imagine a race of creatures whose movements and sensory experiences
are conned to a three-dimensional space within a four-dimensional world.
Such a world appears to its inhabitants to be three-dimensional, and again
the illusory nature of this appearance could be revealed by interaction with
four-dimensional beings via the kinds of phenomena just mentioned.
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So the three-dimensionality of the world could be an illusion. But is
there any reason to think that it is an illusion? Certainly creatures dont
materialize inside locked rooms, and if there are beings who can describe the
current state of our intestines to us, they dont do so by hovering over us
in a fourth dimension (unfortunately). However, modern physics has led to
various kinds of claim that the dimensionality of the world is greater than
three. First, special relativity arguably entails that the time dimension is not
distinct from the three spatial dimensions, and hence that the world is four-
dimensional. While there are interesting questions here about the sense in
which the time dimension can be treated as spacelike, I restrict attention
for present purposes to spatial dimensions, excluding time. Second, string
theory postulates that there are nine (or perhaps ten) spatial dimensions, but
that all but three are curled upso small that they are irrelevant to our ex-
perience. A case might be made that in such a case the three-dimensionality
of the world is an illusion, but since there is no evidence for string theory,
I set this possibility aside as speculation. Finally, quantum mechanics rep-
resents the state of the world via a 3N -dimensional wavefunction, where N
is the number of particles in the universe. Quantum mechanics is not just
speculation; it is a well-conrmed theory. So perhaps there really is evidence
that the three-dimensionality of the world is illusory. But to see whether
this surprising conclusion it is warranted, we rst need to understand why
quantum mechanics requires a 3N -dimensional wavefunction.
1 The Wavefunction
Consider a very simple world, consisting of just two particles moving around
in three-dimensional space. We can pick an origin and three mutually orthog-
onal directions, and hence impose a coordinate system on the space; the state
of the world at a time can then be represented as two points in this space,
say (1; 4; 3) and (9; 2; 6). Alternatively, we can represent the same state as
a single point in a six-dimensional space, namely (1; 4; 3; 9; 2; 6). The latter
is called a conguration space representation, since each point in the space
represents a conguration of particles in ordinary three-dimensional space.
Pretty clearly, the two representations are equivalent any arrangement of
particles in three-dimensional space corresponds to a point in conguration
space, and conversely any point in conguration space corresponds to an
arrangement of particles in three-dimensional space.
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Now suppose that, instead of particles, our toy world contains two elds
continuous distributions of some quantity over three-dimensional space, rather
than discrete particles. That is, the three-dimensional space contains two
objects a function f1(x; y; z) and a second function f2(x; y; z), each repre-
senting the intensity of its respective eld as a function of the three spatial
coordinates. Again, we can represent the same state in a six-dimensional
space as a function F (x1; y1; z1; x2; y2; z2), where the rst three coordinates
are those of the eld f1 and the second three are those of f2. For example,
suppose eld f1 has non-zero intensity only in two regions A and B, and f2
has non-zero intensity only in two regions C and D, as shown (schematically)
in Fig. 1. Here the horizontal axis represents the three spatial dimensions,
Figure 1: Field intensity in 3D space
reduced to one for ease of representation.
Alternatively, we can choose to represent the state of the system in the
six-dimensional space shown (schematically) in Fig. 2(a). Here the horizontal
axis represents the coordinates of f1, the vertical axis represents the coordi-
nates of f2, and the eld intensity can be pictured coming out of the page. In
the f1 coordinates, the eld has non-zero intensity only in regions A and B,
and in the f2 coordinates, the eld has non-zero intensity only in regions C
and D, as in the three-dimensional representation. But note that exactly the
same is true of the eld distributions shown in Fig. 2(b) and 2(c). That is,
any one of these six-dimensional eld distributions (and many others besides)
can adequately represent the three-dimensional eld distribution of Fig. 1.
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Figure 2: Field intensity in 3D space
So any two elds in three-dimensional space can be represented by a eld
in six-dimensional space and in fact there is considerable freedom in choos-
ing the latter, since many such representations contain all the information
in the three-dimensional representation. But by the same token, a eld in a
six-dimensional space cannot in general be represented without loss as two
elds in three-dimensional space, since the six-dimensional eld contains in-
formation that is not present in the corresponding pair of three-dimensional
elds. This is reected in the fact that the distinct six-dimensional elds of
Figs. 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) correspond to one and the same three-dimensions
representation that of Fig. 1.
In quantum mechanics, the state of a system of N particles can be ex-
pressed a function of 3N coordinates, 3 for each particle. This is the wave-
function, written  (x1; y1; z1; : : : xN ; yN ; zN). As this expression suggests, the
wavefunction is most naturally represented in a 3N -dimensional space; in fact
the wavefunction cannot be expressed as a set ofN elds in three-dimensional
space, because the empirical predictions of the theory depend on the infor-
mation that is lost in the three-dimensional representation. For example, for
a two-particle system, the three wavefunctions depicted in Figs. 2(a), 2(b)
and 2(c) would result in di¤erent predictions for the measured positions of
the particles.
The foundations of quantummechanics are notoriously contested, and the
4
status of the wavefunction is no exception. But there is a prima facie case, at
least, that the wavefunction should be regarded as the fundamental entity of
quantum mechanics. It is the evolution of the wavefunction that is governed
by the basic dynamical law of the theory, and it is the wavefunction at the end
of an experiment that generates its empirical predictions. As Bell famously
put it, No one can understand this theory until he is willing to think of
 as a real objective eld . . . Even though it propagates not in 3-space
but in 3N -space (1987, 128). That is, realism in the context of quantum
mechanics arguably commits you to the existence of an entity corresponding
to the wavefunction of the world a 3N -dimensional eld, where N is the
total number of particles in the universe. This is a radical violation of the
intuition that there are three spatial dimensions it is not that there are
four, or ten, but that there are at least 1080 spatial dimensions.
2 Keeping Up Appearances
So why does it look to us as if there are three spatial dimensions, if in fact
there are not? Albert (1996) suggests that the answer lies in the dynamical
laws by which the quantum state evolves in particular, that those laws take
a particularly simple form if the 3N spatial coordinates are grouped into
N sets of 3 (rather than 3N=2 sets of 2, or 3N=4 sets of 4, or whatever).
The argument is a little tricky. Note rst that there is a sense in which
classical behavior emerges from quantum mechanical behavior in the macro-
scopic limit that is, as systems become large and complicated. The sense
is that while microscopic systems must typically be represented by a spread-
out wavefunction in conguration space, macroscopic systems can always be
represented to a good degree of approximation by a point in conguration
space. And a point in 3N-dimensional conguration space, as shown above,
can equally well be represented as N points in three-dimensional space. Of
course, it can also be represented as 3N=2 points in a two-dimensional space,
and so on. But if we choose to group the coordinates into threes, then we
can interpret the dynamical laws by which the N points evolve as func-
tions of the distances between those points the interparticle distances.
(Whereas if we choose to group the coordinates into two or fours or sev-
ens, then the laws will bear no straightforward relation to the interparticle
distances so produced.) That is, even though there is nothing in fundamen-
tal reality corresponding to our choice of coordinate grouping, once we have
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made this choice, a particular description of the behavior of medium-sized
everyday objects becomes available to us, namely the classical description of
objects moving in three-dimensional space subject to forces that depend on
the distances between them. Hence quantum-mechanical worlds are going
to appear (falsely!) to their inhabitants, if they dont look too closely, to
have the same number of spatial dimensions as their classical counterparts
do, namely three (Albert 1996, 282). The reason for the caveat, of course,
is that if we do look closely if we perform experiments that reveal the un-
derlying quantum-mechanical nature of reality then we convince ourselves
that the world cant really be three-dimensional via the arguments of the
previous section.
If Albert is right, then the world is really 3N -dimensional, yet appears
three-dimensional to us. But Albert cant be quite right, for two related
reasons. The rst is Montons objection that the naturalness of the corre-
spondence does not get us anywhere (2002, 269). That is, although it is
true that grouping the coordinates into threes yields a particularly simple
and elegant formulation of the dynamical laws, this simplicity and elegance
cannot be parlayed into an explanation of three-dimensional appearances.
It is true that a particular choice of coordinates sometimes plays a role in
the explanation of appearances. For example, I might choose coordinates in
which my o¢ ce is at rest (rather than ones in which the Sun is at rest) in
order to explain my experience of thunderclouds building behind the sky-
scrapers of downtown Miami. But the dependence of the explanation on the
choice of coordinates here is supercial; it is simply a matter of calculational
convenience. Even if I used the Sun-centered coordinates, it would still be
the case that the clouds, the buildings and my o¢ ce lie in a straight line. The
coordinate-dependence in Alberts account is much more thoroughgoing to
an extent that makes it problematic. For one thing, three points that lie
on a straight line under one grouping of 3N -dimensional coordinates will
not, in general, lie in a straight line under another grouping. For another,
the patterns of points that we identify as buildings and clouds will not, in
general, be present under another grouping. But patterns that appear only
under one arbitrary choice of coordinates are generally regarded as artifacts
of that choice rather than facts about the world, since the facts about the
world presumably dont depend on our representational choices. If there
are no buildings and clouds and o¢ ces that lie in a straight line, then the
explanation of my experience evaporates.
The second reason Albert cant be quite right is that his argument de-
6
pends on the dynamical laws taking di¤erent forms under di¤erent groupings
of coordinates. But, again, it is a commonplace of physics that the laws, be-
ing objective facts about the world, dont depend on our choice of coordinate
system. Hence the laws, properly so-called, cant vary based on the grouping
of the coordinates. But then Albert cant appeal to the simplicity of the
laws under one choice of coordinates to explain the nature of our experience;
the real laws, whatever they are, must be equally simple under any choice of
coordinates (Lewis 2004).
But now we seem to have painted ourselves into a corner. The state
of a quantum mechanical system cant be represented without loss in three
dimensions; it has to be represented in a 3N -dimensional conguration space.
But the evolution of the wavefunction in 3N dimensions cant explain our
three-dimensional appearances. So either quantum mechanics is wrong, or
we are radically deceived about the nature of our own experience. Neither
of these looks like an attractive option.
3 Conguration Space
But all is not lost, since there is another option available to us namely
that we are wrong about the structure of space. A rather atfooted solution
along these lines would be to propose that there are in fact two spaces
the 3N -dimensional space in which the wavefunction evolves, and the three-
dimensional space in which the objects of our experience move around
neither of which can be reduced to the other. But this proposal introduces
as many problems as it solves; how does the motion of the wavefunction
in one space give rise to the motion of objects in a completely separate
space (Monton 2006)? A more subtle solution is that the three-dimensional
structure is already present in the conguration space. Thus far, we have
been treating the space in which the wavefunction evolves as 3N -dimensional
in the same sense that ordinary space is three-dimensional essentially, as
a space spanned by 3N mutually orthogonal vectors and having no other
structure. But perhaps theres more to conguration space than initially
meets the eye.
Consider ordinary three-dimensional space. To impose coordinates on this
space, you choose an origin, a length scale, and three mutually orthogonal
axes. We have been supposing thus far that the coordinatization of cong-
uration space is just like this; to impose coordinates on a 3N-dimensional
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conguration space, you choose an origin, a length scale, and 3N mutually
orthogonal axes. It is precisely this freedom in choosing coordinates that
leads to the problems facing Alberts argument, since our choice of coordi-
nate system a¤ects the form of (what we took to be) the dynamical laws,
and hence undermines their lawlike status.
But suppose instead that we take seriously the idea of a conguration
space as a space of congurations that is, a space which is intrinsically
structured as N sets of three-dimensional coordinates. Mathematically, this
is not hard to do. Instead of modeling the space as an ordered 3N -tuple of
parameters, hx1; x2; : : : ; x3Ni, we model it as an ordered N -tuple of ordered
triples:
hhx1; y1; z1i ; hx2; y2; z2i ; : : : ; hxN ; yN ; zNii :
And rather than specifying the coordinates by choosing 3N axes, we choose
3 the x, y and z axis, which are the same for each triple. That is, x1 through
xN pick out points on the same axis, and similarly for y and z. Then the
wavefunction can be regarded as a function of these parameters as a math-
ematical entity inhabiting a (3N)-dimensional conguration space, rather
than a 3N -dimensional plain space. And the basic thesis of wavefunction
realism is that the world has this structure the structure of a function on
(3N)-dimensional conguration space.
Given that conguration space has this structure, then an Albert-style
appeal to dynamical laws to generate three-dimensional appearance is im-
possible, but it is also unnecessary. It is impossible because the dynamical
laws take exactly the same form under every choice of coordinates (as they
should), so no choice makes the dynamical laws simpler than any other. But
it is unnecessary because the outcome of that argument that the coordi-
nates are naturally grouped into threes is built into the structure of reality,
and hence doesnt need to be generated as a mere appearance based on the
simplicity of the dynamics.
4 Dimension without Illusion
The proposal of the previous section is designed to allow us to say that
the world of quantum mechanics really is three-dimensional, and hence the
three-dimensionality of appearances doesnt have to be generated as any
kind of illusion. Our appearances are veridical. But does the proposal really
allow us to do that? The wavefunction is still a function of 3N independent
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parameters, even if those parameters have some internal structure. Isnt that
a prima facie reason to say that the wavefunction and hence the world is
3N -dimensional?
Previously, I took the lesson here to be that the term dimension is
ambiguous in the quantum-mechanical world (Lewis 2004). One can take it
to refer to the number of independent parameters required to specify a point
in the space in which the quantum state evolves, or one can take it to refer
to the number of independent axes required to impose coordinates on the
space. In the classical case, these two coincide; a point in the space in which
the classical state evolves is specied by three parameters, and imposing
coordinates on the space requires three axes. But in the quantum case, the
two dimension concepts come apart; it takes 3N parameters to specify a
point in the space in which the wavefunction evolves, but only three axes are
required to impose coordinates on this space. Hence if quantum mechanics
is true, there is a sense in which the world is 3N-dimensional and a sense in
which it is three-dimensional. It is the latter sense under which the world
truly appears three-dimensional.
My 2004 position is essentially the same as the one Albert adopts in the
coda to his 1996 paper (although our reasons for adopting the position are
di¤erent). Here Albert restates his thesis a bit more diplomatically(1996,
282). The diplomatic version of his thesis is that there are two ideas were
accustomed to having in mind when we think of physical space. The rst
is the space of possible interactive distances that is, the space in which
the distances between points are the interparticle distancesappearing in
the dynamical laws. This space is three-dimensional the dynamical laws
are laws of a three-dimensional world. The second is the space in which a
specication of the local conditions at every address at some particular time
(but not at any proper subset of them) amounts to a complete specication of
the physical situation of the world, on that theory, at that time. This space
is 3N -dimensional; it takes a specication of the wavefunction amplitude at
every point in a 3N -dimensional space to completely specify the quantum
state of the world. So, diplomatically speaking, it is not that the three-
dimensionality of the world is an illusion; rather, the world really is three-
dimensional under one reading of dimension, and it really is 3N -dimensional
under the other reading.
This position still seems tenable to me, but there is an alternative position
that I now nd more attractive. Albert initially claimed that the world is 3N -
dimensional, and the appearance that the world is three-dimensional (when
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we dont look too closely) is illusory. Later he claimed (and I concurred) that
the three-dimensional appearances (when we dont look closely) and the 3N -
dimensional appearances (when we do) can both be taken as veridical, since
dimensionis ambiguous. However, there is a third possibility namely that
the world is three-dimensional, and the 3N -dimensional appearance of the
world when we look closely is illusory. That is, our everyday impression that
the world is three-dimensional is correct, but the impression we get from
our quantum-mechanical experiments that the world is 3N -dimensional is
misleading. This third position seems to have something to be said for it,
and in what follows I explore and defend it.
5 Dimensions and Parameters
The claim that the quantum world is 3N -dimensional is based on the fact
that the wavefunction is a function of 3N independent parameters. This is
a perfectly good characterization of dimension in some general sense of
the concept. But the number of independent parameters is not always a
good way to characterize the spatial dimensionality of a system. Sometimes
a parameter is not a spatial parameter at all. For example, in evolutionary
game theory, the state of a population of organisms can be represented as
a function of n parameters, one for each organism, where each parameter
represents the continuum of possible strategies the organism can adopt in
interacting with the others, and the function represents the probability dis-
tribution over the strategy space i.e. the chance that organisms will use
particular strategies in their interactions with each other. Clearly nothing
should be inferred from this model about the (literal, rather than gurative)
space in which the organisms live.
But of course in the quantum case the parameters are spatial; each is
a position coordinate for a particle. Still, it doesnt follow that the repre-
sentation is of a spatially 3N -dimensional world. Consider again the case of
evolutionary game theory. Insofar as such a model is intended to be real-
istic, it is intended to be about n individual organisms, each with its own
probability distribution for adopting a particular strategy. But there may
be information in the full n-dimensional representation that is lost when the
population is represented as n single-organism states. We can reinterpret
Figs. 1 and 2 to demonstrate this. Suppose Fig. 1 represents the strategy
distributions for two organisms; organism 1 adopts strategies of type A and
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type B with equal probabilities, and organism 2 adopts strategies C and D
with equal probabilities. But the single-organism properties of Fig. 1 are
compatible with each of the three n-organism states represented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2(a) represents a state in which the strategy adopted by each organ-
ism is independent of that adopted by the other organism, and Figs. 2(b)
and 2(c) represent states in which the strategy adopted by each organism
depends on what the other does. Clearly the future evolution of the system
depends on which n-organism state the population has. But this wouldnt
warrant the inference that reality consists of an n-organism entity rather than
n individual organisms. The organisms just happen to have complicated con-
ditional properties; their strategies depend on those of the organisms with
which they interact. The most convenient way to represent these conditional
properties perhaps the only convenient way is via the n-dimensional state,
but nothing ontological should be read into this.
One can adopt a similar position with regard to the quantum mechanical
wavefunction. That is, the fact that the state of a quantum system can be
represented without loss as a single wavefunction in a 3N -dimensional cong-
uration space but not asN single-particle wavefunctions in three-dimensional
space does not entail that the world is spatially 3N -dimensional. Rather, one
could interpret the situation as one in which the single-particle wavefunctions
have complicated conditional connections; the position properties encoded in
the wavefunction of one particle depend on those of the other particles (Wal-
lace and Timpson 2009). The 3N -dimensional wavefunction may be the only
convenient way to represent these properties, but it does not follow that it lit-
erally represents the spatial structure of the world. This is not to give up the
assumption of wavefunction realism; the structure of the wavefunction accu-
rately reects the structure of the world, but some of that structure consists
in correlations between spatial positions. The wavefunction is a function of
3N parameters, but we need not interpret each parameter as an independent
spatial direction.
6 Spatial Phenomena
So far, I have argued that we need not interpret the quantum world as spa-
tially 3N -dimensional; we cant simply read the spatial structure of the world
o¤ the mathematical structure of our representation. But this leaves open
the question of how we should interpret the wavefunction. The question is
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whether the 3N parameters of conguration space deserve to be called spatial
dimensions. And the answer, I suggest, hangs on the connections between
those parameters and spatial phenomena.
The claim that the quantum world is three-dimensional is based on a fairly
direct correspondence between the structure of conguration space and the
structure of our spatial experience. I can stick my arm out in some arbitrary
direction and stipulate that every third conguration-space parameter refers
to that direction, and similarly pick two directions orthogonal to my arm to
correspond to the remaining conguration-space parameters. Hence the sense
in which the world is three-dimensional is straightforwardly a spatial sense.
But no such direct correspondence to experience is available for the claim that
the quantum world is 3N -dimensional; if the rst and fourth conguration
space parameter are in fact orthogonal spatial directions in some sense, this
is no part of my experience. Hence the doubt that the 3N parameters should
be characterized as spatial.
Still, an indirect correspondence to experience might be available. Con-
sider again the Flatland scenario that we started with. The two-dimensional
Flatlander suspects that he is really living in a three-dimensional world be-
cause various phenomena he observes are explicable in terms of three dimen-
sions, but not in terms of two. Similarly, various phenomena in the quantum
world are explicable on the assumption that the quantum state evolves in a
3N -dimensional space, but arguably not under the assumption that it evolves
in a three-dimensional space. Consider, for example, the Mach-Zehnder in-
terferometer shown in Fig. 3(a). A single-particle wave packet (labelled 1 in
the diagram) enters the device at the bottom left and is split into two equal
wave packets by the half-silvered mirror A. The two packets are reected by
mirrors at B and C respectively, and both arrive at the second half-silvered
mirror D. If the path lengths ABD and ACD are exactly equal, then the
wave components emerging towards detector F are exactly out of phase the
troughs of one wave coincide with the peaks of the other and the two waves
exactly cancel out. By the same token, the wave components emerging to-
wards detector E are exactly in phase the peaks coincide and the troughs
coincide and the two waves add in intensity. The result is a single wave
packet, of exactly the intensity of the one input at the bottom left, emerging
towards detector E. That is, the two wave packets travelling via B and C
collide and interact at D, producing a single wave packet travelling towards
E.
Now suppose that the wave packet travelling via B interacts with a wave
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Figure 3: Mach-Zehnder Interferometer
packet associated with another particle (labelled 2 in the diagram), and the
wave packet travelling via C does not, as shown in Fig. 3(b). What happens
now is that the two wave packets arriving at D no longer interact, resulting in
wave packets travelling onwards towards E and F. It is as if the wave packets
pass by each other rather than colliding. Indeed, if one adopts a conguration
space representation, this is exactly what happens; the packet travelling via
B undergoes a shift in the coordinates of the second particle, whereas the
packet travelling via C undergoes no such shift. If the coordinates of the
second particle are pictured as coming out of the page in Fig. 3(b), then the
two wave packets pass by each other because one passes above the other in
this dimension.
Here, then, we apparently have indirect evidence that the quantum world
is 3N -dimensional. The extra dimensions seem necessary to explain the in-
teractions, or lack of them, between wave packets. But this evidence needs to
be treated with considerable caution. Note in particular that wave packets
corresponding to di¤erent particles cannot pass by each other in the way just
described; if two wave packets corresponding to two di¤erent particles ap-
proach the same region of three-dimensional space, then they interact. This
is a consequence of the dynamical laws; the solidity of particles is repre-
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sented in the dynamical laws in this way. In particular, the dynamical laws
ignore how far the wave packets are apart in the 3N -dimensional congura-
tion space. But then the phenomena are not really what one would expect
of objects moving in a 3N -dimensional space.
Of course, Albert might reply here that I have switched back to the
sense in which conguration space is three-dimensional namely that the
dynamical laws are those of a three-dimensional space. Quite right but
my contention here is precisely that the usual sense of the term spatial
is intimately connected with dynamical laws. Spatial phenomena concern
whether or not objects bounce o¤ one another or pass by one another and
these are dynamical concepts.
Still, it remains true that two wave packets that are components of the
state of one and the same particle sometimes interact and sometimes pass by
each other when their three-dimensional coordinates coincide. Doesnt this
require the existence of extra dimensions in which the passing-by can take
place? Certainly one needs parameters in the theory, the values of which
determine whether or not the packets interact. And in the quantum case,
the parameters in question refer to the coordinates of the other particles in
the system i.e. they encode how the wave packet for the particle we are
following is correlated with the wave packets for the other particles. But as
argued above, the structure underlying such correlations need not be regarded
as itself spatial. In fact, the point of this example is to argue that it would
constitute a stretch of our ordinary sense of spatialto apply it in this case.
7 The Pragmatic Dimension
The world looks three-dimensional unless one looks closely, when it looks
3N -dimensional. But which appearance is veridical, and which the illusion?
Albert initially contends that the three-dimensionality of the everyday world
is illusory, and that 3N -dimensional wavefunction one discerns in quantum
phenomena is the reality behind the illusion. What I have tried to do here is
to argue for the converse of Alberts initial position; the world really is three
dimensional, and the 3N -dimensional appearance of quantum phenomena is
the theoretical analog of an illusion; we represent quantum reality to ourselves
as 3N -dimensional in order to more readily visualize the correlations between
wave packets. The basic reason for thinking of things this way round is
that the sense in which the quantum world is three-dimensional corresponds
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directly to the way we already use the term spatial, whereas the sense in
which it is 3N -dimensional does not.
Still, even if it would be a stretch to apply the adjective spatialto the
3N dimensions of conguration space, there is nothing to stop us doing so;
it would not be the rst time that ordinary usage has shifted as a result of
scientic advances. This is ultimately a pragmatic matter. But I nd it hard
to see any motivation for such a shift, since the phenomena in question are so
far removed from everyday life. We modied our concepts of rest and motion
to accommodate the idea that the Earth is moving, but doing so also gave
us the tools to better describe everyday phenomena. If a shift in our concept
of spatial dimension would reap similar benets, then no doubt such a shift
should and will occur. But until then, we can say with a straight face that
the world is three-dimensional.
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